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I.

INTRODUCTION

W

hether intrusive intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations can be lawfully conducted against a coastal State depends on where
the collecting State is operating. Seaward of the territorial sea and national
airspace, all States have the absolute right under international law to conduct
intrusive ISR operations against another State.
International law divides the maritime and air domains into clearly defined zones. Each zone has a specific legal regime that determines the
amount of control coastal States can exercise over the activities of foreignflagged merchant ships and warships, as well as civilian and State aircraft,
operating within these zones.
Waters landward of the baseline of the territorial sea form part of the
internal waters of the coastal State. 1 All States may also claim a territorial sea
up to a limit not exceeding twelve nautical miles, measured from baselines
determined in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS). 2 Coastal States exercise sovereignty over their land
territory, internal waters, archipelagic waters (in the case of archipelagic
States), and the territorial sea. 3 Coastal State sovereignty also extends to the
national airspace over internal waters, land territory, and the territorial sea. 4
Within national airspace, States are responsible for providing air traffic ser-

1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 8, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
2. Id. art. 3.
3. Id. art. 2. In international straits completely overlapped by territorial seas, which connect one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and another part of the
high seas or an EEZ, all ships and aircraft enjoy the right of unimpeded transit passage
through such straits and their approaches. Id. arts. 37–44; U.S. NAVY, U.S. MARINE CORPS
& U.S. COAST GUARD, NWP 1-14M/MCTP 11-10B/COMDTPUB P5800.7A, THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS § 2.5.3.2 (2022) [hereinafter
NWP 1-14M]. Similarly, all ships and aircraft enjoy the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage
while transiting through, under, or over archipelagic waters and adjacent territorial seas via
all routes normally used for international navigation and overflight. UNCLOS, supra note 1,
arts. 53–54; NWP 1-14M, supra note 3, § 2.5.4.1. During transit passage and archipelagic sea
lanes passage, ships may not carry out any research or survey activities without the prior
authorization of the bordering or archipelagic States. UNCLOS, supra note 1, arts. 40, 54.
4. UNCLOS, supra note 1, arts. 40, 54; Convention on International Civil Aviation art.
1–2, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295, Dec. 7, 1944[hereinafter Chicago Convention].
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vices in flight information regions (FIR)—“an airspace of defined dimensions within which flight information service and alerting service are provided”—established in accordance with Annex 11 (Air Traffic Services) to
the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention). 5
Beyond the territorial sea and national airspace, coastal State authority
over user State activities is limited. In a zone contiguous to the territorial sea,
coastal State authority is limited to taking necessary measures to prevent and
punish infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary laws and
regulations committed within its territory or territorial sea. 6 UNCLOS also
created a new zone—the two hundred nautical mile exclusive economic zone
(EEZ)—for the purpose of granting coastal States greater control over the
living and non-living resources adjacent to their coasts. 7 Coastal State jurisdiction in the EEZ also extends to resource-related artificial islands and
structures, marine scientific research (MSR), and protection of the marine
environment. 8 Apart from this limited coastal State authority, all ships and
aircraft enjoy high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight, and other internationally lawful uses of the seas related to these freedoms (such as intrusive ISR) in the EEZ. 9
UNCLOS does not provide for coastal State authority over international
airspace above the contiguous zone and EEZ. Nonetheless, coastal States
may be authorized to provide air traffic services in FIR established pursuant
to a regional air navigation agreement approved by the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). 10 FIR rules and procedures,
however, do not apply to State aircraft, including military aircraft, as a matter
of international law. 11
International law also does not prohibit a State from establishing an air
defense identification zone (ADIZ) in national and international airspace adjacent to its coast to the extent that the ADIZ does not impede high seas
freedom of overflight and other internationally lawful uses of international
5. Chicago Convention, supra note 4, annex 11 ¶ 2.1.1.
6. The contiguous zone may not extend beyond twenty-four nautical miles from the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. UNCLOS, supra note 1,
art. 33.
7. Id. arts. 55–57.
8. Id. art. 56.1(b).
9. Id. arts. 58, 86–87, 89; NWP 1-14M, supra note 3, § 2.6.2.
10. Chicago Convention, supra note 4, annex 11 ¶ 2.1.2.
11. Id. art. 3; U.S. Department of Defense, DoD Instruction 4540.01, Use of International Airspace by U.S. Military Aircraft and for Missile and Projectile Firings ¶ 3.c(2)(b),
(incorporating change 1, May 22, 2017) [hereinafter DoDI 4540.01].
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airspace provided for in international law. In times of peace, all States have
a right to establish reasonable conditions of entry into their land territory,
internal waters, and national airspace. Thus, aircraft approaching national
airspace may be required to provide identification even while in international
airspace, but only as a condition of entry approval. 12
This article examines the legal framework for conducting intrusive ISR
in the air and maritime domains. It reviews some of the more prominent
arguments used by States that purport to regulate such activities beyond their
territorial sea and national airspace. The article concludes that all States have
an absolute right under both conventional and customary international law,
as well as long-standing State practice, to conduct intrusive ISR operations
from beyond the territorial sea and national airspace of coastal States.
II.

INTRUSIVE ISR FROM THE MARITIME DOMAIN

The validity of intrusive ISR in the maritime domain depends on the location
from which the operation is conducted. Intelligence collection within internal waters is regulated in the same way that intelligence collection is treated
on land. Intelligence collection by ships transiting the territorial sea would
be inconsistent with the innocent passage regime. Intrusive ISR conducted
beyond the territorial sea, however, is considered an internationally lawful
use of the sea that is not subject to coastal State jurisdiction or interference.
A. Internal Waters and Territorial Sea
Internal waters have the same legal character as the land territory. Therefore,
foreign-flagged military and commercial vessels may only enter internal waters with the consent of the coastal State. 13 Intrusive ISR from within internal
waters is considered espionage, which is punishable under the domestic laws
of the coastal State. 14
Coastal State sovereignty over the territorial sea is subject to the right of
innocent passage for all ships, including warships and other government
non-commercial vessels. 15 When exercising the right of innocent passage,
12. DoDI 4540.01, supra note 11, ¶ 3.c(1)(b). See Section III(c), infra, for a discussion of
rules applicable in ADIZs.
13. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 25(2).
14. See 18 U.S.C. § 793 for the U.S. law on gathering, transmitting, or losing defense
information.
15. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 17.
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submarines and other underwater vehicles must navigate on the surface and
fly their flag. 16 Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace,
good order, or security of the coastal State. 17 One of the activities that is
considered to be prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the
coastal State, and therefore inconsistent with the right of innocent passage,
is “any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defense or
security of the coastal State.” 18 The submerged transit of a submarine or collection of intelligence while transiting the territorial sea would therefore be
inconsistent the regime of innocent passage, thereby allowing the coastal
State to take necessary steps to prevent passage of ships engaged in activities
proscribed by Article 19 of UNCLOS. 19
Nevertheless, because warships and other government non-commercial
vessels enjoy complete immunity from foreign jurisdiction, 20 the coastal State
may only order the non-compliant ship or submarine to leave the territorial
sea immediately. 21 Unless required in self-defense to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent, the use of armed force against a non-compliant warship
or other government non-commercial vessel would violate the vessel’s sovereign immunity. 22
Moreover, the United States takes the position that the “innocent passage provisions of the Convention set forth conditions for the enjoyment of
the right of innocent passage in the territorial sea.” 23 They do not, however,
“prohibit or otherwise affect activities or conduct that is inconsistent with
that right and therefore not entitled to that right.” 24 Similarly, although Article 20 requires submarines and other underwater vehicles to navigate on the
surface and to show their flag in order to enjoy the right of innocent passage,
“failure to do so is not characterized as inherently not ‘innocent.’ ” 25 Therefore, while intelligence collection and submerged transits are inconsistent

16. Id. art. 20.
17. Id. art. 19.
18. Id. art. 19.2(c).
19. Id. art. 25.1.
20. Id. art. 32.
21. Id. art. 30.
22. “ARA Libertad” (Arg. v. Ghana), Case No. 20, Order of Dec. 15, 2012, 2012 ITLOS Rep. 332, ¶¶ 94–95; The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
23. S. EXEC. REP. NO. 110-9, at 12 (2007).
24. Id.
25. Id.
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with the right of innocent passage, they are not a violation of general international law or an internationally wrongful act that gives rise to the use of
countermeasures.
B. Contiguous Zone, Exclusive Economic Zone, and High Seas
As discussed below, intrusive ISR may lawfully be conducted against coastal
States from anywhere beyond the territorial sea.
1.

Contiguous Zone

The contiguous zone is a law enforcement zone. Within the zone, coastal
State jurisdiction is limited to exercising the control necessary to prevent and
punish infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary laws and
regulations committed within its territory or territorial sea. 26 Five States—
Cambodia, China, Sudan, Syria, and Vietnam—illegally purport to assert “security” jurisdiction in their twenty-four nautical mile contiguous zones. 27
These claims are inconsistent with the negotiating history of the Convention,
which rejects that coastal States retain residual competencies (like security
jurisdiction) beyond the territorial sea. 28 Thus, intrusive ISR is an internationally lawful use of the sea that is not subject to coastal State interference
or control.
2.

Exclusive Economic Zone

As previously indicated, within their EEZ, coastal States enjoy sovereign
rights for the limited purpose of “exploring, exploiting, conserving and managing” living and non-living natural resources, as well as jurisdiction over
resource-related off-shore installations and structures, MSR, and protection
and preservation of the marine environment. 29 Coastal States do not, however, exercise sovereignty in the zone. The term “sovereign rights” was pur-

26. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 33.
27. U.S. Department of Defense, Maritime Claims Reference Manual,
http://www.jag.navy.mil/organization/code_10_mcrm.htm (last updated Feb. 8, 2022).
28. II UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY 529–30 (Satya N. Nandan & Shabtai Rosenne eds., 1993) [hereinafter VIRGINIA COMMENTARY II].
29. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 56.
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posely chosen to clearly distinguish between the coastal State’s limited authorities in the EEZ and the more comprehensive coastal State right of sovereignty over the territorial sea. 30 Article 89, which applies to the EEZ pursuant to Article 58(2), confirms that States do not exercise sovereignty beyond the territorial sea and therefore may not assert jurisdiction over security-related matters in the EEZ. 31
The Convention is explicit in this regard. Although the EEZ is a sui generis
zone, 32 Article 86 makes clear that nothing in the article abridges the nonresource-related high seas “freedoms enjoyed by all States in the EEZ in
accordance with Article 58.” 33 Thus, the Convention retains the distinction
for the EEZ that had previously existed between the high seas, which are
open to all States, and the territorial sea, where the coastal State exercises
sovereignty. Regarding intrusive ISR, ships transiting the territorial sea in innocent passage may not collect “information to the prejudice of the defense
or security of the coastal State.” 34 A similar restriction does not appear in
Part V of the Convention.
Thus, within foreign EEZs, all States enjoy high seas freedoms of “navigation and overflight . . . and other internationally lawful uses of the seas
related to those freedoms.” 35 These “other internationally lawful uses of the
seas” may be conducted without coastal State notice or consent and include
a broad range of military activities, including intrusive ISR. Efforts by a
handful of States to limit military activities in the EEZ were rejected by a
majority of the States participating in the Third United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III). 36 The overwhelming majority of States
agreed that “military operations, exercises and activities have always been

30. VIRGINIA COMMENTARY II, supra note 28, at 531–44. See also JAMES KRASKA &
RAUL PEDROZO, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME SECURITY LAW 233 (2013).
31. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 58.2 (Articles 88-115 apply to the EEZ in so far as they
are not incompatible with Part V), art. 89 (“no state may validly purport to subject any part
of the high seas to its sovereignty”).
32. Id. art. 86 (The provisions of Part VII “apply to all parts of the sea that are not
included in the exclusive economic zone”).
33. Id.; III UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY 60–71 (Satya N. Nandan & Shabtai Rosenne eds., 1995) [hereinafter VIRGINIA
COMMENTARY III].
34. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 19.2(c).
35. Id. art. 58.1.
36. VIRGINIA COMMENTARY II, supra note 28, at 529–30.
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regarded as internationally lawful uses of the sea” and that the “right to conduct such activities will continue to be enjoyed by all States” in the EEZ. 37
III.

INTRUSIVE ISR FROM THE AIR DOMAIN

In peacetime, activities in the air domain are regulated by the Chicago Convention. Like maritime ISR operations, the validity of intrusive ISR in the air
domain depends on whether the intelligence collection is being conducted
in national or international airspace. In general, intrusive ISR conducted in
national airspace can be restricted by the coastal State, but ISR in international airspace is not subject to coastal State jurisdiction or interference.
A. National Airspace
National airspace is subject to coastal States’ sovereignty and includes all airspace above the land territory, internal waters, archipelagic waters (for archipelagic States), and territorial sea. 38 There is no right of innocent passage for
aircraft through national airspace. However, coastal State sovereignty over
the territorial sea and archipelagic waters is subject to the right of transit
passage 39 and archipelagic sea lanes passage, 40 respectively.
Coastal States are responsible for providing air traffic services in FIRs
within their national airspace. 41 However, the Chicago Convention and its
annexes only apply to civil aircraft. 42 Nonetheless, State aircraft—aircraft
used in military, customs, and police services 43—may not enter national airspace without the consent of the coastal State 44 and must operate with “due
regard” for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft. 45 Thus, intrusive ISR
from within national airspace may be prohibited by the coastal State.

37. 17 THIRD UN CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, PLENARY MEETINGS, OFFICIAL RECORDS 244, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WS/37 and ADD.1–2 (1984) [hereinafter
OFFICIAL RECORDS vol. 17]; Study on the Naval Arms Race: Report of the Secretary-General, ¶ 188,
U.N. Doc. A/40/535 (Sept. 17, 1985).
38. UNCLOS, supra note 1, arts. 2, 49; Chicago Convention, supra note 4, arts. 1–2.
39. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 38.
40. Id. art. 53.
41. Chicago Convention, supra note 4, annex 11 ¶ 2.1.1.
42. Id. art. 3(a).
43. Id. art. 3(b).
44. Id. art. 3(c).
45. Id. art. 3(d).
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Legal Framework Applicable to Intrusive ISR

Vol. 99

To illustrate, between 1945 and 1977, over forty U.S. reconnaissance aircraft were shot down in the European and Pacific regions. 46 Most of these
attacks were justified on the grounds that the aircraft had violated national
airspace. 47 During the 1950s and 1960s, the issue of aerial reconnaissance
was discussed in the Security Council following several incidents between
U.S. and Soviet aircraft. When asked if surveillance aircraft could be attacked
over the high seas, the Soviet representative rejected the position that coastal
States had the right to interfere with intelligence collection activities in international airspace. 48 The United Kingdom delegation similarly indicated without objection that aerial surveillance directed at a coastal State from international airspace was consistent with international law and the UN Charter. 49
A recent example of the distinction between national and international
airspace is the shootdown of a Turkish RF-4E Phantom reconnaissance aircraft by Syrian forces in June 2012. Damascus claimed that the Turkish spy
plane was illegally collecting intelligence from within its national airspace. 50
Similarly, in June 2019, an unmanned U.S. MQ-4C Triton surveillance drone
was shot down by the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) in the Persian Gulf. The commander of the IRGC’s aerospace force claimed that the
MQ-4C was downed by an Iranian missile while it was collecting intelligence
in Iran’s national airspace. 51
46. Center for Cryptologic History, Dedication and Sacrifice: National Aerial Reconnaissance
in the Cold War, https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jul/13/2002761784/-1/-1/0/DEDICATION-SACRIFICE.PDF (last visited Nov. 14, 2022).
47. Oliver J. Lissitzyn, The Role of International Law and an Evolving Oceans Law, 61 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 563, 566–67, 574–75, 578–79 (1980); Samuel J. Cox, H-029-3: A
Brief History of U.S. Navy Cold War Aviation Incidents (Excluding Korea and Vietnam), NAVAL
HISTORY AND HERITAGE COMMAND (Apr. 2019), https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/nhhc/about-us/leadership/director/directors-corner/h-grams/h-gram029/h-029-3.html.
48. See U.N. SCOR, 9th Sess., 680th mtg., U.N. Doc. S./P.V.680, ¶ 125 (Sept. 10, 1954).
49. See U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 881st mtg., U.N. Doc. S./P.V.881, ¶ 64 (July 25, 1960).
50. Eric Schmitt & Sebnem Arsu, Backed By NATO, Turkey Steps Up Warning To Syria,
NEW YORK TIMES (June 26, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/27/world/middleeast/turkey-seeks-nato-backing-in-syria-dispute.html.
51. U.S. officials denied the allegation, indicating that the attack was unprovoked and
that the MQ-4C was legally operating in international airspace. Richard Sisk, Iran Chose to
Take Out Drone Instead of Manned Navy Jet, Iranian General Says, MILITARY.COM (June 21, 2019),
https://www.military.com/daily-news/2019/06/21/iran-chose-take-out-drone-insteadmanned-navy-jet-lranian-general-says.html; Iran’s IRGC Force Shoots Down Intruding US Spy
Drone, PRESSTV (June 20, 2019), https://www.presstv.com/Detail/2019/06/20/5989
42/Iran-IRGC-US-spy-drone.
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B. International Airspace
All airspace seaward of the territorial sea is considered international airspace
and, like the high seas, is not subject to coastal State sovereignty. Neither
UNCLOS nor the Chicago Convention grants coastal States any authority
over military aircraft operating in international airspace.
Except for production of energy from the winds, UNCLOS limits
coastal State authority in the EEZ to the seabed, its subsoil, and the waters
superjacent to the seabed. 52 Therefore, coastal States may not rely on the
Convention to assert jurisdiction over military activities, including intrusive
ISR, that occurs in international airspace seaward of the territorial sea.
Similarly, the Chicago Convention only limits military activities in national airspace and exempts State aircraft from compliance with its international airspace provisions. State aircraft are, therefore, not required to comply with procedures applicable to FIRs in international airspace that are under coastal State control for purposes of providing air traffic services to civil
aviation. 53 Efforts at ICAO to designate the airspace above the EEZ as national airspace were rejected by the ICAO Legal Committee, indicating the
proposal would flagrantly contradict “the relevant provisions of UNCLOS
which equate the EEZ . . . with the high seas as regards freedom of overflight.” 54 In short, nothing in UNCLOS or the Chicago Convention provides
a legal basis for regulating intrusive ISR activities in international airspace.
C. Air Defense Identification Zones
As discussed above, international law does not prohibit a State from establishing an ADIZ in national and international airspace adjacent to its coast
to the extent that the ADIZ does not impede high seas freedom of overflight
and other internationally lawful uses of international airspace provided for
in international law. An ADIZ is defined as a special designated airspace of
defined dimensions within which aircraft are required to comply with special
identification and/or reporting procedures that supplement those related to
civil air traffic services. 55
52. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 56.
53. Chicago Convention, supra note 4, art. 3, annex 11 ¶ 2.1.2.
54. BARBARA KWIATKOWSKA, THE 200 MILE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE IN THE
NEW LAW OF THE SEA 203 (1989).
55. Chicago Convention, supra note 4, annex 15. The United States defines an ADIZ
as an area of airspace over land or water in which the ready identification, location, and
856
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The United States and Canada jointly established the first ADIZ in 1950.
The United States currently maintains four ADIZs—the contiguous U.S.
ADIZ (with Canada), Alaska ADIZ, Guam ADIZ, and Hawaii ADIZ. 56
These ADIZs were established to assist in the early identification of aircraft
in international airspace approaching U.S. national airspace. The United
States established the Japanese ADIZ in 1951 and transferred management
of the zone to Japan in 1969. The United States also established the South
Korean ADIZ in 1951 during the Korean War. A number of other States
claim ADIZs, including South Korea, China, India, Italy, Norway, Pakistan,
and Taiwan. 57
The United States does not recognize any claim by a State to apply its
ADIZ procedures to foreign aircraft not intending to enter national airspace,
nor does the United States apply its ADIZ procedures to foreign aircraft not
intending to enter U.S. airspace. 58 Thus, intrusive ISR from within an ADIZ
in international airspace is authorized.
U.S. military aircraft transiting through a foreign ADIZ that do not intend to enter foreign national airspace normally will not identify themselves
or otherwise comply with ADIZ procedures unless the United States has
specifically agreed to do so. If a U.S. military aircraft intends to penetrate the
national airspace of the ADIZ country the aircraft commander will follow
the applicable ADIZ procedures. 59
control of all aircraft, except military and other State aircraft, is required in the interest of
national security. 14 C.F.R. § 99.3 (2021).
56. 14 C.F.R. § 99.43 (2004) (Contiguous U.S.); 14 C.F.R. § 99.45 (2004) (Alaska); 14
C.F.R. § 99.47 (2004) (Guam); 14 C.F.R. § 99.49 (2004) (Hawaii).
57. Peter Dutton, Caelum Liberam: Air Defense Identification Zones Outside Sovereign Airspace,
103 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 691, 691 n.3, 707 n.104 (2009).
58. U.S. ADIZ rules are contained in Chapter 5 of the Federal Aviation Administration’s Aeronautical Information Manual. 14 C.F.R. §§ 99.1–99.49 (2021). All aircraft intending to enter U.S. national airspace must file flight plans, provide periodic reports, and have
a functioning two-way radio. 14 C.F.R. §§ 99.9(a)–(c), 99.11(a), 99.17(b)–(c), 99.15(a), 91.183
(2021). Foreign civil aircraft may not enter the United States through an ADIZ unless the
pilot reports the position of the aircraft when it is not less than one hour and not more than
two hours average direct cruising distance from the United States. 14 C.F.R. § 99.15(c)
(2021). An aircraft may deviate from the above rules during an emergency that requires an
immediate decision and action for the safety of flight. 14 C.F.R. § 99.5 (2021). See also Exec.
Order No. 10,854, Nov. 27, 1959, 24 Fed. Reg. 9565, 3 C.F.R., 1959–1963 Comp., at 389
(extending the application of 49 U.S.C. § 40103 to the overlying airspace of water outside
the United States beyond the twelve nautical mile territorial sea in which the United States
has appropriate jurisdiction or control).
59. DoDI 4540.01, supra note 11, encl. 3 ¶ 3.d(1)(a).
857

International Law Studies

2022

An example of an illegal ADIZ is the Chinese zone in the East China
Sea, which was established in November 2013. The ADIZ regulations require all aircraft entering the zone to file a flight plan and maintain communications with Chinese authorities, operate a radar transponder, and be
clearly marked with their nationality and registration identification. Aircraft
that fail to comply with the identification procedures or follow the instructions of Chinese authorities will be subject to undefined “defensive emergency measures.” 60 China’s application of its ADIZ procedures to all transiting aircraft, regardless of whether they intend to enter Chinese national airspace, interferes with high seas freedom of overflight in international airspace and is, therefore, inconsistent with international law. 61
IV.

ILLEGAL COASTAL STATE RESTRICTIONS ON INTRUSIVE ISR

Dissatisfied with the outcome of UNCLOS III, eighteen nations currently
purport to regulate or prohibit military activities, including intrusive ISR,
seaward of their territorial sea. 62 These efforts are clearly inconsistent with
the text of the Convention, customary international law, and State practice.
Coastal State constraints vary from State-to-State, but the two most prevalent arguments include (1) limitations on hydrographic surveys and military
marine data collection (military surveys) and (2) restrictions on non-peaceful
uses of the seas.
A. Limitations on Marine Data Collection
UNCLOS grants coastal States exclusive jurisdiction over MSR in their
EEZ. 63 States that purport to assert jurisdiction over military marine data
collection (surveillance operations and oceanographic (hydrographic) surveys) in the EEZ argue that such activities are analogous to MSR and are
therefore subject to coastal State control.
60. People’s Republic of China, Ministry of National Defense, Announcement of the
Aircraft Identification Rules for the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone of the
People’s Republic of China, CHINADAILY.COM.CN (updated Nov. 23, 2013 12:02 PM),
https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-11/23/content_17126618.htm.
61. UNCLOS, supra note 1, arts. 58(1), 87(1)(b), 89; Chicago Convention, supra note 4,
art. 1, 3, 9.
62. These States include Bangladesh, Brazil, Burma (Myanmar), Cape Verde, China,
India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, North Korea, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Thailand, and Uruguay.
63. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 56.1(b)(ii).
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China, for example, prohibits all types of marine data collection in its
EEZ without its consent. 64 Surveying and mapping are broadly defined in
Article 2 of the 2002 Surveying and Mapping Law to include “surveying,
collection and presentation of the shape, size, spatial location and properties
of the natural geographic factors or the manmade facilities on the surface, as
well as the activities for processing and providing of the obtained data, information and achievements.” 65 Both the 1998 and 2002 laws purport to
apply to all types of data collection—MSR, hydrographic surveys, and military marine data collection—and are therefore inconsistent with international law, including UNCLOS. 66
Although the terms “marine scientific research” and “hydrographic surveys” are not defined, the Convention clearly differentiates between MSR,
hydrographic surveys, and intelligence collection in several articles. Article
19.2(j) and Article 52 prohibit both “research or survey activities” for ships
engaged in innocent passage. 67 Collecting information to the prejudice of the
defense or security of the coastal State while engaged in innocent passage is
also proscribed by Article 19.2(c) and Article 52. 68 Ships engaged in transit
passage through international straits “may not carry out any research or survey activities” without the consent of the States bordering the strait. 69 The
same limitation applies to ships passing through archipelagic sea lanes. 70
More importantly, Article 56 and Part XIII only grant coastal States authority

64. Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the
Continental Shelf, Order No. 6, (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong.,
Feb. 26, 1998, effective June 26, 1998), art. 8, (China); Provisions on the Administration of
Foreign-Related Maritime Scientific Research, 1996 (promulgated by Decree No. 199 of the
State Council of the People’s Republic of China, June 18, 1996) (China); Law of the People’s
Republic of China on the Surveying and Mapping, (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 29, 2002, effective Dec. 1, 2002), art. 7, [hereinafter 2002 Surveying and Mapping Law].
65. 2002 Surveying and Mapping Law, supra note 64, art. 2.
66. Raul Pedrozo, Coastal State Jurisdiction over Marine Data Collection in the Exclusive Economic Zone: U.S. Views, in MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE EEZ: A U.S.-CHINA DIALOGUE ON
SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE MARITIME COMMONS 23–26 (Peter Dutton
ed., 2010) (No. 7 China Maritime Study); J. ASHLEY ROACH & ROBERT W. SMITH, EXCESSIVE MARITIME CLAIMS 413–50 (3d ed. 2012).
67. UNCLOS, supra note 1, arts. 19.2(j), 52.
68. Id. arts. 19.2(c), 52.
69. Id. art. 40.
70. Id. art. 54.
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over MSR—surveys and intelligence collection are not mentioned—and Article 87 only refers to “scientific research.” 71
Thus, while coastal States may regulate MSR and surveys in the territorial
sea, archipelagic waters, international straits, and archipelagic sea lanes, they
may not regulate hydrographic surveys or other marine data collection in the
other maritime zones, including the contiguous zone and the EEZ. Hydrographic surveys and other military marine data collection activities are internationally lawful uses of the sea that are exempt from coastal State jurisdiction and can be conducted by all States beyond the territorial sea as high seas
freedoms. 72
The distinction between MSR and other forms of marine data collection
articulated in UNCLOS reflects centuries of State practice. Naval ships have
plied the world’s oceans for centuries collecting marine data for military
use. 73 That practice continues today. Ships from Australia, China, Japan,
NATO, Russia, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States
(to name a few) routinely engage in oceanographic surveillance and survey
activities seaward of foreign territorial seas to ensure safety of navigation,
build oceanographic and meteorological profiles, maintain force protection,
and inform military commanders and civilian leaders. 74
For example, the U.S. Navy maintains a fleet of over twenty ships that
perform a variety of missions, including oceanographic surveys, underwater
surveillance, hydrographic surveys, and missile tracking and acoustic surveys. 75 Six of these ships are multipurpose oceanographic survey ships that
perform acoustic, biological, physical, and geophysical surveys using
multibeam, wide-angle, precision sonar systems that allow the ships to chart
wide areas of the ocean floor to enhance the Navy’s information on the marine environment. A seventh oceanographic survey ship collects data in
coastal regions around the world that is used to improve technology in undersea warfare, enemy ship detection, and charting the world’s coastlines.
The Navy also operates five ocean surveillance ships that use both passive
and active low-frequency sonar arrays to detect and track undersea threats.
71. Id. arts. 56, 87, Part XIII.
72. Id. arts. 58, 86, 87.
73. Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, Responding to Ms. Zhang’s Talking Points on the EEZ, 10 CHINESE
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 207, ¶ 16 (2011); VIRGINIA COMMENTARY III, supra
note 33, at 63–64.
74. Pedrozo, supra note 73, ¶ 5.
75. U.S. Navy Fact File, Oceanographic Survey Ships—T-AGS (updated Oct. 13,
2021), https://www.navy.mil/Resources/Fact-Files/Display-FactFiles/Article/2222996/
oceanographic-survey-ships-t-ags/.
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These ships additionally provide locating data that promote navigational
safety of various undersea platforms. Operations by these ships seaward of
the territorial sea are consistent with international law and long-standing
State practice.
B. Restrictions on Non-Peaceful Uses of the Seas
Some States, including China, argue that military activities, including intrusive ISR, are inconsistent with the “peaceful purposes” provisions of UNCLOS. 76 Such an argument is not supported by a plain reading of the Convention, the deliberations of the Security Council, or long-standing State
practice.
Article 301 requires that States “refrain from any threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State.” 77 This
language mirrors the text of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which prohibits
armed aggression in international relations between States. 78 UNCLOS,
however, distinguishes between “threat or use of force” and other militaryrelated activities, such as intelligence collection. Article 19.2(a) repeats the
language of Article 301, prohibiting ships in innocent passage from engaging
in “any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or
political independence of the coastal State.” 79 Article 19.2(c) prohibits ships
engaged in innocent passage from “collecting information to the prejudice
of the defense or security of the coastal State.” 80 This differentiation clearly
demonstrates that UNCLOS does not equate the “threat or use of force”
with intelligence collection. Rather, the test of whether a military activity (like
intrusive ISR) is “peaceful” is determined by Article 2(4) of the UN Charter

76. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 301 (“In exercising their rights and performing their
duties under this Convention, States Parties shall refrain from any threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United
Nations”).
77. Id.
78. U.N. Charter art. 2(4) (“All Members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations”).
79. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 19.2(a).
80. Id. art. 19.2(c).
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and other obligations under international law, including the inherent right of
individual and collective self-defense, reflected in Article 51 of the Charter. 81
Most commentators that have addressed this issue agree that “based on
various provisions of the Convention . . . it is logical . . . to interpret the
peaceful . . . purposes clauses as prohibiting only those activities which are
not consistent with the UN Charter.” 82 Thus, they concluded that the peaceful purposes clauses in the Convention “do not prohibit all military activities
on the high seas and in EEZs, but only those that threaten or use force in a
manner inconsistent with the UN Charter.” 83
Whether peacetime surveillance constitutes an act of aggression was specifically addressed by the Security Council in the 1960s. Following the shoot
down of an American U-2 spy plane near Sverdlovsk in May 1960, efforts
by the Soviet Union to have a Security Council resolution adopted that
would have labelled the U-2 flights as “acts of aggression” under the Charter
were rejected by a vote of seven to two (with two abstentions), thereby confirming that peacetime intelligence collection (even in national airspace) does
not violate the UN Charter. 84 Four months later, Soviet forces shot down an
American RB-47 surveillance aircraft operating over the Barents Sea off the
Kola Peninsula. The United States claimed that the aircraft was operating in
international airspace. The Soviet Union alleged that the aircraft was within
its national airspace when it was engaged. 85 Nevertheless, Soviet efforts to
have the Security Council designate the U.S. surveillance flight an act of aggression once again failed by a vote of nine to two. 86
A similar conclusion is reflected in a 1985 Report of the Secretary-General on the Study of the Naval Arms Race. The report notes that the Convention
81. VIRGINIA COMMENTARY III, supra note 33, at 89–91; 5 THIRD UN CONFERENCE
LAW OF THE SEA, 67TH PLENARY MEETING, OFFICIAL RECORDS 62, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.62/SR.67 (Apr. 23, 1976); Bernard H. Oxman, The Regime of Warships under the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 24 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 809, 829–32 (1984).
82. Moritaka Hayashi, Military and Intelligence Gathering Activities in the EEZ: Definition of
Key Terms, 29 MARINE POLICY 123 (2005).
83. Id.
84. See U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 857th mtg. ¶ 99, U.N. Doc. S/PV.857 (May 23, 1960)
(text of USSR’s draft resolution); U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 860th mtg., ¶ 87, U.N. Doc.
S/PV.860 (May 26, 1960) (result of voting on draft resolution).
85. Cable Dated 13 July 1960 From the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics Addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U.N.
Doc. S/4384 (July 13, 1960).
86. U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 883d mtg., ¶ 187, U.N. Doc. S/PV.883 and Add.1 (July 26,
1960).
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declares that “the high seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes,” but
does not define the term. 87 Nonetheless, the Convention provides an answer
when it declares in Article 301 that
in exercising their rights and performing their duties under this Convention, States Parties shall refrain from any threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the principles of international law embodied in
the Charter of the United Nations. 88

Thus, the report concludes that “military activities which are consistent with
the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United
Nations, in particular with Article 2, paragraph 4, and Article 51, are not
prohibited by the Convention on the Law of the Sea.” 89
V.

CONCLUSION

For the foreseeable future, a handful of States will continue to interfere with
naval vessels and military aircraft engaged in intrusive ISR beyond the territorial sea and national airspace. By raising the political and military costs of
such operations, these States seek to pressure nations to remain outside their
EEZs when conducting military activities, including intrusive ISR. These efforts clearly impinge on traditional uses of the seas and airspace by other
States, are inconsistent with international law, and should be opposed by all
sea-going nations. If the position of these nations becomes the new international standard, 38 percent of the world’s oceans that were once considered
high seas and open to unfettered military use will come under coastal State
regulation and control. Such a result was not part of the package deal agreed
to at UNCLOS III. 90

87. U.N. Secretary-General, Study on the Naval Arms Race, U.N. Doc. A/40/535, annex
¶ 188 (Sept. 17, 1985).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. OFFICIAL RECORDS vol. 17, supra note 37, at 244. Accord signing and ratification
statements of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation, and the United
Kingdom, U.N. Treaty Collection, Status of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea
(status as of Nov. 11, 2022), https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20II/Chapter%20XXI/XXI-6.en.pdf (scroll down to relevant State). See also Elmar
Rauch, Military Uses of the Oceans, 28 GERMAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 229,
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This conclusion is best summed up by the President of UNCLOS III,
Ambassador Tommy T.B. Koh of Singapore. Speaking at a conference in
2008, Ambassador Koh recalled that
some coastal states would like the status of the EEZ to approximate the
legal status of the territorial seas. Many other states held the view that the
rights of the coastal states in the EEZ are limited to the exploitation of
living and non-living resources and that the water column should be treated
much like the high seas. 91

He continued, “I find a tendency on the part of some coastal states . . . to
assert their sovereignty in the EEZ . . . is not consistent with the intention
of those of us who negotiated this text and is not consistent with the correct
interpretation of [Part V] of the Convention.” 92

241–42 (1985); Boleslaw Adam Bocek, Peaceful Purposes Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 20 OCEAN DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 329, 363,
368 (1989).
91. Tommy T.B. Koh, Remarks on the Legal Status of the Exclusive Economic Zone, in FREEDOM OF SEAS, PASSAGE RIGHTS AND THE 1982 LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION 53 (Myron
H. Nordquist et al. eds., 2009).
92. Id. at 54–55, 87.
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